When people disagree with a definition, their reasons for doing so usually include the fact that either (a) the definition contains some false claims about its subject-matter; or (b) the definition omits some true claims about its subject matter. Richard Kuper strongly objects to the EUMC Working Definition of Antisemitism; indeed he warmly endorses the UCU decision to refuse to have anything to do with it. The puzzle about his attack on the Definition is that his reasons for disagreeing with it don't include either (a) or (b) above. He thinks that what the Definition says is true; and though he seems to think it omits to say certain things, he's wrong about that in ways which are so blatant that it's hard to believe that he can possibly mean it.
Kuper's main grouse about the definition is that he thinks it conflates anti-Semitism with legitimate criticism of Israel; in fact he thinks it can only be understood as 'a propaganda campaign by Israel and its supporters against the country's deteriorating public image'. This response by certain parts of the Left to any charge of anti-Semitism is now so routine, so knee-jerk, that in itself it's entirely unremarkable; its only interest lies in the reasons which are put forward for making this egregious claim. Kuper offers us three reasons, one of which can be dismissed as irrelevant at once. He thinks that the definition was drafted by people some of whom have political views which he strongly dislikes, and that these views shaped earlier drafts of the definition. But even if true, this is irrelevant: either the allegedly objectionable views of some of the drafters made an objectionable difference to the final draft, or they didn't. If they didn't, then we need spend no further time on them: reference to the drafters and their supposed views is now purely ad hominem. If they did, then that difference will be there to be seen in the definition itself, and criticism of the supposedly objectionable difference can focus on what's actually there in the definition. Reference to the views of the drafters will now be redundant.
Kuper offers two further reasons for thinking that the definition conflates criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism. But before we examine them, we should remind ourselves of what it is that the Working Definition actually says about criticism of Israel. The definition says of the following claims or practices that they could be anti-Semitic in certain contexts:
1. Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, eg by claiming that a State of Israel is a racist endeavour;
2. Applying double standards to Israel, by requiring of it a behaviour which isn't demanded of any other democratic nation;
3. Using the symbols and images associated with classic anti-Semitism (eg of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterise Israel or Israelis;
4. Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis;
5. Holding Jews collectively responsible for the actions of the State of Israel.
Now does Kuper think this is false? Does he think that these claims can't be anti-Semitic? No, not at all: he fully acknowledges that they can be anti-Semitic. So to that extent he agrees with the Definition; he thinks it's got these things right. In fact for point 3 he believes something stronger than the Definition: he thinks that deployment of the symbols of classic anti-Semitism is always anti-Semitic, a point to which he will return, as we shall see. However in spite of this measure of agreement, he's not at all pleased with the Definition, though the reason he gives for his displeasure is a puzzling one. What he says of the remaining 4 out of the 5 practices listed above is that though they could be anti-Semitic, they needn't be. And he then gives various examples which he thinks shows that such practices needn't be anti-Semitic. The odd thing about this is that in making this claim, he isn't in any way disagreeing with the Definition. What Kuper says does in fact follow from what the Definition says. It says that such things could be anti-Semitic. It's part of the meaning of the word 'could' that if A could be B, then it needn't be B. If it's true that lying could be wrong in some contexts, it follows that in other contexts it needn't be. If it's true that donating to a political party could in some contexts be the best use of your money, it follows that sometimes it isn't. So Kuper's indignant insistence that sometimes, for example, denying the Jews a right to self-determination needn't be anti-Semitic says no more than what the Definition itself already implies.
Now Kuper undoubtedly knows the meaning of the word 'could', as does any competent user of the English language. So it's highly implausible that this is really his reason for objecting to the Working Definition. All the weight of his objection really falls on the third reason which he gives. Here what he's bothered about is a presumption which he asserts is made by the Definition: the presumption that the above practices are very likely to be anti-Semitic. This is what he thinks is untrue, and this is what he claims to detect in the Definition. But where does he find it? The Definition certainly says no such thing. Kuper however detects the presence of the presumption in the following way: in his view point 3 in the above list, the point which claims that use of the classic symbols of anti-Semitism could be anti-Semitic, is in fact under-stated: such use would always, he claims, be anti-Semitic. With this in hand, he then goes on to assert that the other points, which truly claim that various practices could be anti-Semitic, are tainted by appearing in the company of a practice which is always anti-Semitic. Because point 3 is always anti-Semitic, points 1,2,4 and 5 take on, he suggests, the same aura, and we are wrongfully led to presume that they too are very likely to be anti-Semitic.
That is, Kuper objects to the Working Definition of anti-Semitism because a claim, which it doesn't even make, is supposed to magically taint other claims, which Kuper agrees are true, in ways which he tells us conflate criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism. I don't think I've ever come across a more convoluted, forced, and thoroughly implausible argument against a definition. But before we leave Kuper's apology for a critique, let us take a farewell look at the implications of what he himself says. What Kuper thinks is that someone who denies that Jews have a right to self-determination; who applies double standards to Israel by requiring of it a behaviour which isn't demanded of any other democratic nation; who holds Jews collectively responsible for the actions of the State of Israel; and who draws comparisons between contemporary Israeli policy and that of the Nazis, needn't be acting or speaking anti-Semitically. The EUMC Working Definition of anti-Semitism, which he is at such pains to dismiss, in fact allows for this possibility. Nonetheless he thinks that this possibility is enough to reveal that the Working Definition is 'waging a propaganda war against critics of Israel', and that it should be buried.
We might reasonably think that Kuper, and indeed the UCU Executive, would offer us a better definition of anti-Semitism, particularly since they're so certain that the practices they want to protect aren't anti-Semitic at all. Strangely, they don't do this, at least not formally. But we can perhaps infer what Kuper really thinks anti-Semitism amounts to by what he says in his final sentence. There he tells us that the fight against anti-Semitism is 'muddied' by those 'who confuse criticism of Israeli violations of human rights and international law with hatred of Jews'. It looks as if Kuper thinks that anti-Semitism is purely a matter of hostile emotions: it occurs when people feel hatred for Jews. There is a huge philosophical and sociological literature on racism devoted to the general version of this issue, and it's widely agreed that hostile feelings aren't necessary for any kind of racism, including anti-Semitism. That this is true can be readily seen as soon as we consider the following case: a person (the same would go for an institution) possesses no felt hostility towards blacks; there is no hatred for them in his heart that anyone can discern. But this person (or institution) selects out blacks for special criticism; judges them by standards harsher than those which are used to judge others; campaigns for them to be punished more than others; holds some of them responsible for misdemeanours committed by others of them; and compares the behaviour of black-majority states to that of the Nazis. All of these things can be said and practised by people who feel no hatred, and yet such discriminatory behaviour would certainly count as anti-black racism. Most of these things have been said and practised, with reference to Jews, by members of the UCU, whose activities Kuper so warmly endorses. Perhaps it's not surprising, therefore, that he wants to reject a more complex definition of anti-Semitism in favour of one which is so narrow that much racist behaviour will easily evade its terms. (Eve Garrard)