The latest post on Oliver Kamm's blog - behind the Times paywall - is about the status of theology. Oliver's view is a harsh one. He says that theology is 'an intrinsically valueless subject', a 'violation and not merely a parody of the quest for knowledge'. Spelling out his reasons for thinking this, he writes:
Those aspects of a theology degree course that are of genuine intellectual worth all come from other disciplines: ancient languages, history, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, history of art and literary criticism. But theology as a discipline in its own right is an intellectual scam.
The reason is not even that it assumes the existence of what it's supposed to be illuminating, and is therefore question-begging. It's rather that the purpose of theology is to defend a body of doctrine.
I'm no student of theology and never have been. I've read a bit of post-Holocaust theology, that's all. Still, I have an opinion on the matter; I think Oliver is wrong. I mean to try to show why he is wrong by making a case on the narrowest possible basis: that is, by taking the scope of theology to be much more limited than even he allows it to be. If the argument can be made persuasively on so narrow a basis, then I suggest there must be a viable case for theology as a subject despite Oliver's peremptory dismissal of it.
Taking my cue from his suggestion that theology is merely parasitic on other - genuine - disciplines, I shall assume that the subject is no more than a sub-branch of philosophy. Forget ancient languages, history, sociology and the rest. Let us agree for argument's sake that the whole content of theology is exhausted by those questions in philosophy that are to do with the idea of God and with cognate notions (such as the immortality of the soul). So theology would be that sub-branch of philosophy that explored such issues as: what reasons there are for thinking there's a God, or for thinking that there isn't one - I leave it at merely one God in order to simplify the argument - and what qualities a God might be expected to have if a God existed, and how it is possible, if it is, to reconcile the idea of a benevolent God with the existence of evil; and so forth. My question now is this. Why, even under so restricted an account of what theology is, wouldn't it be a legitimate domain of inquiry, as constituted by philosophical questions of this kind? If the answer is, because we know there is no God and therefore such philosophical inquiries are pointless, then there is something both overreaching and inappropriate to the domain of philosophy contained in that answer. Overreaching since there's an assumption of absolute certainty of knowledge foreign to the vocation of philosophy. Insisting, as though it were an issue closed for all time, that there is no God is not the same thing as the proper scepticism of the rational atheist who says that she has no grounds for belief in God on the basis of anything that has been argued or established to date. And inappropriate since philosophers are not limited, in the kinds of questions they ask, by the constraints of what is known provisionally - nearly all knowledge being provisional - to be the case. Philosophers often hypothesize about things that may be, as a matter of what we think we know, false; they do this as a way of exploring alternatives. What if I were merely dreaming? What if there were no minds other than my own? What if the whole world were a figment of my imagination? Or... Imagine a world in which everyone had exactly the same talents. Imagine having to choose your own place in society from behind a veil of ignorance. Etc.
If philosophers may legitimately ask questions and suggest hypotheses in this free and open way, why should not that branch of philosophy which is concerned with the existence or non-existence of God, and with all other questions either closely or loosely related to the idea of God, not constitute a valid domain of inquiry?
One other thing. Oliver says that 'the purpose of theology is to defend a body of doctrine'. But from my own limited knowledge of the field, I have the impression that there are doctrinal differences aplenty among theologians. Just for one example, those who justified the ways of God in having countenanced the Nazi death camps were not defending the same doctrine as those who began to speak of the death of God.
[For two previous normblog posts obliquely related to this one, see here and here.]