Yesterday I came across this:
Every man is also responsible for all the good he didn't do. - Voltaire
If we take it at face value, it's got to be wrong. You can't be responsible for what you have no ability to do, and all the good you didn't do is such a huge amount of good that you could never have done it all even if you'd seriously tried. Suppose you could have helped A who needed your help, by going around to his house for a couple of hours once a week and doing whatever it was he needed in the way of help. But you could also have helped B who needed your help, by going around to her house for a couple of hours once a week and doing whatever it was she needed in the way of help. And one can continue this series from C through Z, and then A1 through Z1, A2 through Z2, A3 through Z3 - so there will be more hours of potential good-doing than are to be had from a single week. It is a certainty that there is a greater number of people you can help in this particular way, and in serious need of your help, than there are hours in which to help them. And any other potential form of good-doing (charitable donation, working for a cause etc) can be handled similarly to show there is a crushingly impossible burden of responsibility, the world and the needs of those who live in it being what they are.
Mere pedantry, it might be suggested. Though the quote says 'all the good he didn't do', intellectual charity dictates that we should interpret it as meaning something like 'all the good he didn't do and could have managed to do'. But it, too, is wrong. If you or I are judged according to this way of understanding the dictum, then we must use our time to the very limit of what's possible, doing good rather than pursuing an interest or pleasure of our own that does less good. So, never mind that I didn't help some of those people, A through Z3, seriously needing my help; provided I helped as many of them as I could, and never took time off to watch football when that time could have met someone's more serious need, I would have fulfilled my putative obligation to do good.
This must mean, however, that no one should do anything more frivolous, less worthwhile than, for example, relieving hunger, relieving pain, acting to put an end to torture or other grave violations of human rights, acting to expose and fight against injustice. It's not only watching football that would be ruled out. Could you justify chatting to friends, taking your children on a picnic, playing the violin, going for a ride on your bike, belonging to a book group, and so forth? (And this is not the end of it either. Imagine someone who gives 60 per cent of her time to helping others but doesn't spend that time optimally; in the same time she could do more good than she actually does. Must we hold her responsible for the net deficiency in her good-doing?)
Even the requirement that you do as much good as you conceivably can do would mean that none of your time was any longer your own; you would be, to all intents and purposes, a slave to the needs of others. That is not compatible with the idea that each of us has a right to freedom, and that our freedom may properly be used to pursue our own ends and to give some priority to the needs of those to whom we are closest.
I believe we do have such a right and that our freedom is properly used when we give a significant amount of time to using it for personal ends. We do also have a more extensive obligation to help others than most of us either admit to or act upon. But precisely where to draw the line in this matter - between the right to freedom and the obligation to help others - is not a question I know how to answer.