My friend Jeff Weintraub draws attention to a piece by Eric Reeves in the Christian Science Monitor. Sixty years after the adoption of the UN Genocide Convention, Reeves argues that it 'has never prevented a single genocide'. In the light of the situation in Darfur he asks if 'the UN Convention has any remaining force or meaning'. Echoing these sentiments, Jeff wonders 'whether we should stop pretending and simply give up on the Genocide Convention... or somehow try to do better'.
I can't imagine how we could conclude in favour of the first of these two options. It is, as Jeff himself observes, a counsel of despair. The only morally viable meanings that can be attached to it are, first, an acceptance of the conclusion I have argued for here before, that the right of humanitarian intervention by states cannot be made conditional on UN authorization though it is preferable if there is such authorization; and, second, that one should not continue to labour under the facile delusion that effective international arrangements for the prevention of genocide are already in place. They aren't. But if this doesn't mean seeking outright alternatives to existing arrangements, it has to mean trying to improve them - looking for ways of strengthening the existing Convention and/or better mechanisms for implementing it. Eric Reeves has a couple of suggestions:
[I]f the primary purpose of the Genocide Convention is prevention, the UN and international community must act before there is juridical or historical certainty. We are obliged to act when there is compelling evidence of large-scale destruction of a "national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such."On this point, see the earlier post of mine here. Reeves writes also:
The debacle of deployment in Darfur argues that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations desperately requires a substantial, robust standing force, prepared to deploy urgently to protect civilian populations facing genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. Actual deployment would be at the request of the Secretary-General, and while a two-thirds majority of the Security Council should be formally required, deployment must not be held hostage to the veto of the five permanent members. This requires substantial revision of the UN Charter, but fundamental changes at the UN are widely recognized as critical for the organization to remain relevant in the 21st century.Whatever one might think of any particular suggestion, trying to do better - somehow - is surely obligatory.