Religion and political argument

Chris Dillow responds to a question posed by Johann Hari. Here is Johann's question:

I think faith is a dangerous form of bad thinking - it is believing something, without evidence or reason to back it up... Yet at the same time, when there are so many Murdochian pressures on a British Prime Minister dragging them to the right... isn't it good to have a countervailing pressure to help the poor - even a superstitious one? If religion drives [Gordon] Brown's best instincts and whittles down his worst, should we still condemn it?

In answering, Chris overlooks that there are two ways in which we can take the question Johann begins by asking here, and overlooking this, he replies to the less interesting of the two. For Johann asks, '[I]sn't it good to have a countervailing pressure to help the poor - even a superstitious one?' The two senses in which we can take this are:

[1] Isn't it good to have a countervailing pressure... even a superstitious one, rather than not having that countervailing pressure?

and

[2] Isn't it good to have a countervailing pressure... even a superstitious one, rather than being able to rely solely on rational non-religious advocacy?

I say that the first question is more interesting than the second, because for anyone who thinks that faith is bad thinking and dangerous, it's going to be obvious what the answer to the second question must be. Why would they prefer faith as a way of obtaining beneficial results, to argument from moral principles they believe to have a rational basis? Yet Chris duly answers Johann's question in the second of the two senses above, as you can see from all of the three reasons he gives in support of his answer: it's better (these reasons tell us), it's more persuasive, not to rely on faith-based advocacy.

The question, however, whether the atheist or agnostic should want to forego the good influences and consequences that might come from the religious beliefs of those who hold them is open to more than one answer. Should secular organizations for the rescue of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe have shunned or regretted the participation of Christians motivated by Christian teachings regarding the oneness of humankind? Should egalitarians today regret the efforts of Christians who fight for a more equal society because of Christian teachings about helping the poor? I know how I would answer these questions. I would say No. Presumably, someone might answer Yes on the grounds that getting beneficial effects from bad, faith-based, beliefs isn't worth it, because it might give those beliefs some extra life. But how is this different from the illiberalism of thinking that moral truth is encompassed by a single set of ideas, and of denying that there are alternative ways - sometimes even starting from questionable premisses - of living a good life?

Chris's claim, incidentally, that religious-based arguments aren't persuasive is question-begging. They may persuade people who share the assumptions that he and I reject.

[For an afterthought, see here.]