There are two interesting discussions of the issue I raised here and here about the moral premisses of pluralist liberalism.
Tom Freeman doesn't so much address the paradox or tension I spoke about as focus on some of the practical reasons that can be given in favour of a pluralist liberal political framework - in particular, human fallibility. I have no quarrel with him about this, but I think it leaves the point I was making where it was. As few or as 'thin' as the value-based assumptions Tom relies on may be, value-based assumptions is what they are.
Jonathan Derbyshire argues that there isn't really a tension or paradox where I suggested one, and he's right. He says:
Rather, what I think both his [i.e. my - NG] posts do is precisely to point up the moral commitments underpinning liberalism and to remind us that its allegiance to values like toleration and equality can't mean that it is neutral among all ways of life or belief systems.That accurately captures what I was meaning to say, and brings it out more clearly than I did. So why my suggestion of a tension or paradox in the first place? I suppose because I think some liberals disguise from themselves that there are substantive moral commitments underpinning the 'neutral' political framework that they favour. Neutral in many ways it is, but only up to a point.