Promoting good relations 2

Shalom Lappin replies to Eve Garrard:

I very much enjoyed your well-argued posting concerning the University of Leeds's suspension of Frank Ellis for his racist views.

I must admit to being deeply torn on this issue. I agree with you that Ellis's right to free speech and political expression must be protected, despite the odious nature of his views. However, there is another aspect of this problem that demands consideration. If Ellis imports his racist opinions into the classroom or gives vent to them on campus, students and colleagues who belong to ethnic groups that his views target can justly claim to suffer racist harassment. According to several of Ellis's former students (in a letter to the Observer), he does in fact subject students to his views, although these have no connection to his area of teaching and research expertise (Russian literature). In this case, Leeds seems to be acting properly in invoking the Race Relations Amendment Act of 2002, which requires public institutions to promote good relations between the racial and ethnic groups that they serve. You are quite right in pointing out that this Act should also be applied to academics who promote discrimination against people on the basis of national and ethnic identity. As you suggest, an obvious case would be British academics who seek to exclude Israelis from editiorial boards of journals, candidacy for jobs, acceptance to degree programs, etc., simply because they are Israelis.

It is reasonable to question whether a lecturer who publicly announces deeply racist and sexist attitudes can be trusted to treat black or women students and colleagues fairly. If we assume that the views that someone professes to hold strongly determine his or her conduct, then proclaiming racist and sexist theories of intelligence disqualifies one from evaluating the work of black or female students. There is, I think, a clear analogy here between the Ellis case and that of a racist candidate for a jury in the trial of a black defendant. We rule the racist ineligible for jury service in the trial while still insisting on his right to express his reprehensible views outside of the courtroom. Universities and other public institutions have a legal obligation to insure fair, non-racist treatment for all of their participants.

Eve responds:

The argument you raise about the implications of racist or sexist views is an intensely interesting one. I have very mixed feelings about this - on the one hand, your jury example is very convincing, but on the other hand I think that setting a precedent of punishing people for the implications of their views, on the grounds that holding the views is bound to make them act in accordance with those implications, is a bit worrying. Obviously, if a person with racist views does act on them, he can properly be punished for it, and if Ellis has indeed treated students in a discriminatory way then suspending him is legitimate. But the suspension should be for the discriminatory behaviour, not for the implications of his views. After all, some people with racist views behave better than their philosophy, and we wouldn't want to punish them for the implications which they don't actually act on - inconsistency isn't a crime! And some people with impeccable views behave in racist ways, and we don't accept an appeal to their endorsement of high principles as a defence. But I have to say I find the juror case very telling, so I need to think more about this.

Shalom follows up:

Yes, it is a complex issue, and I certainly see the force of your concern to protect the right of a university employee to express any political view without fear of reprisal. However, the power of the jury example consists in the fact that it focuses on the connection between the potential juror's views and his or her position of authority. This is one of the primary questions at issue in the Ellis case. He is a lecturer who must judge students and colleagues. He has power over their academic careers, and his views are relevant to his performance of his duties as a lecturer. I agree that a person may well act inconsistently with his professed opinions, both in honourable and dishonourable modes, as you suggest. But with the racist juror we are not prepared to take this chance. We regard his or her expressed opinions as sufficient grounds for disqualification from the role of impartial judge in a case involving someone directly affected by the potential juror's racist attitudes. It is hard to see how we can avoid the same conclusion in the case of a university lecturer entrusted with power over students and colleagues. This case requires more reflection. Thanks for arguing one side of it so skilfully. I am still persuaded that the other side prevails.

And Eve comes back in turn:

There's an obvious disanalogy between the juror case and the lecturer case, namely that the would-be juror doesn't suffer significantly by being excluded from the jury, but the lecturer does suffer from losing his job. However, though I think that's true, it doesn't really get to the heart of the matter here, does it? The core of the dispute seems to be this: on the one hand, we have the serious risk of damage to those who are judged by a person whose racist beliefs may well spill over into his judgements and actions, since beliefs and actions are so closely connected. On the other hand, we have the fact that people don't always act on their beliefs, and also a concern about whether we'll end up punishing people not for what they do but for what they think (this is a worry about the Thought Police, I think). If freedom of speech is to be protected, we need to draw a sharp distinction between speech and action, penalizing only the latter and not the former. You rightly cast doubt on whether this distinction can be maintained, especially where judging others (often vulnerable others) is involved. I continue to worry about the possible injustice of conflating the two, and about how to preserve our freedom to say unpopular things if we're to be penalized on the implications of what we say. But one thing we definitely agree on is that the issue needs more reflection!