During the period running up to the AUT Council on 26 May it wouldn't be a bad idea to take a look at the state of the arguments, one way and another, on the projected boycott of Israeli universities. I do this, of course, not as a neutral in the debate, but as someone firmly opposed to that boycott. Still, I hope I have enough experience of what a good counter-argument looks like, and enough detachment from my own partisanship, not to misreport what is coming from the other side. I write on the basis of everything I've been reading on this topic in the last three weeks, which is a lot, and of what I've heard from people supporting the boycott decision, including in a debate I participated in at the University of Leeds earlier this week.
This post is devoted to the state of the argument (as I perceive it) on the issue of academic freedom. Opponents of the boycott hold that it is a fundamental principle of what free universities and a free and open intellectual life are about that individuals should not be punished, not be cut off from, or restricted within, the community of scholarship, on account of policies of their government or because of where they live or for any other arbitrary reason. Yesterday I referred to Statute 5 of the International Council for Science on the principle of 'the universality of science', in which it is said:
This principle entails freedom of association and expression, access to data and information, and freedom of communication and movement in connection with international scientific activities, without any discrimination on the basis of such factors as citizenship, religion, creed, political stance, ethnic origin, race, colour, language, age or sex.Merely to spell out these norms suffices to show how vital, how integral, they are to the life of the civilized academy. And they have accordingly been reaffirmed lately, in opposition to the AUT's current stance, by such reputable bodies as the New York Academy of Sciences:
This call for boycott contradicts the most basic tenets of academic life which have been repeatedly reaffirmed by international bodies including those to which the United Kingdom adheres.The American Association of University Professors has likewise affirmed 'the free exchange of ideas among academics irrespective of governmental policies and however unpalatable those policies may be viewed', and it has pointed out, further, that the AUT exclusion from its boycott of 'conscientious' Israeli academics and intellectuals opposed to their state's policies, is...
.....
The AUT resolution, by selecting individuals and universities for boycott, is a very clear reminder of "McCarthy-like" tactics of accusation which were the shame of the United States some 40-50 years ago.
...an exclusion which, because it requires compliance with a political or ideological test in order for an academic relationship to continue, deepens the injury to academic freedom rather than mitigates it.One would have thought these might be weighty enough considerations to have drawn from supporters of the boycott - and I speak primarily here of those within universities, people who must surely be expected to hold these values in high regard - some kind of substantial defence. What do they think about the damage to principles of academic and intellectual freedom? Do they think there is no damage? How do they mean to implement the relevant political test for Israeli academics? Will there be AUT vetting committees? How will these be composed and how make their decisions about which Israelis are deemed kosher, and which not, for the purpose of academic cooperation? And is not the very idea of such a political vetting process worrying to supporters of the boycott, to their idea of their own calling?
If there are answers to these questions out there, I haven't come across them. Correction - that's the rhetoric of partisanship talking; I'll rephrase it. If there are answers to these questions out there of any serious substance, I haven't come across them. I can offer only two things purporting to be answers. First, on the principles themselves of academic freedom, I have heard the case simply conceded: yes, opponents of the boycott are right on this score, but these aren't hard and fast principles; they have to give way to other considerations. Second, on the vetting process: it's not a big deal; Israeli critics of Israeli government policy, the occupation etc., have perfectly easy ways of making themselves known, so there won't be any practical problem. That's it? On the question of whether a person may or may not participate in a conference at a British university, or have her paper refereed for a journal, or what have you, just some rough-and-ready process of 'Oh yes, she's OK; he isn't' and so forth.
That the suppporters of the boycott appear not even to be troubled about the setting aside of principles fundamental to their own profession and to what they are supposed, and claim, to be about in this world, and that the question of exclusions of people (Israeli academics) from the community of research and intellectual exchange might be dealt with in as cavalier a way as above indicated... I suggest that the pro-boycott case emerges with no credit from this.
Perhaps I've missed something that's out there. Perhaps, also, there are more cogent pro-boycott arguments on other points.