James Garvey at Talking Philosophy is asking what happens to the extent of our moral obligations in hard times:
Do you think, when times get tough and even as your own belt has to tighten, that you have more moral obligations, fewer obligations or just the same obligations to others?
I don't know the answer to his question. The subject is big and complicated. But I will try to justify the proposition that our moral obligations do not grow.
Some simplifying assumptions. First, I will ask the question only of those not themselves affected by significant belt-tightening, and therefore in as good a position to help others as they were before. Second, I abstract from particular situational factors that might be thought to determine the answer for a given person - such as that her close friend or neighbour is suddenly thrown into grave financial difficulty or that she is accidentally brought face to face with a case of acute suffering while out and about one day. Third, I assume that there are duties of charity, rescue and so forth, irrespective of how geographically close to us those in need of help may be, duties in virtue of the simple humanity of those others. I pose James's question, in other words, in a wholly general way, asking: do the moral obligations of those who can help others increase in times of great hardship?
How one answers the question will depend, of course, on how large one believes a person's moral obligations to be in this regard in the first place. If you do not think there are any duties of care that do not arise either from voluntarily-entered into contracts or from the requirements that go with a particular social position (like that of a parent) or particular professional role, then people's non-specific obligations of care to others will remain what they were in hard times (that is, zero), and will not grow. If, on the other hand, you think we should help others in modest ways, ways that are comfortably within our reach, then you may reckon that times in which there is a greater volume of need make an increased demand on those who are in a position to help, and they should be willing to stretch themselves a bit further than they're used to doing.
My own hypothesis is this one. Given the extent of need and suffering in the world even in times when there is no generalized global economic crisis, nearly everyone who is in a position to help has moral duties that are far more demanding than they themselves either acknowledge or live up to. I don't care to spell out just how demanding these duties are, because I don't know how to. We all have a right to pursue our own lives and purposes, to look after our interests and those of the people closest to us. But beyond that we have obligations to do something about the sufferings of others that go well beyond what most of us in fact do. The coming of economic crisis draws extra attention to this lamentable state of affairs, but the duties are so demanding already that it doesn't significantly increase them. Even as things were, say, a year or two ago, there was far more that you and I could and should have done for others in need than we did.
