If you've been badly treated within an organization but those who were responsible for your maltreatment are no longer part of the organization, having moved on, is there anything incoherent, or anything wrong, with someone now in a position to speak for that organization offering you an apology on its behalf? Not at all. It makes perfect sense. In certain circumstances it can be a morally appropriate thing to do.
Mick recommends this piece by Theodore Dalrymple as a good one. I think it contains some useful cautions but that its central contention is sociologically and philosophically indefensible. Dalrymple calls it 'false apology syndrome' when apologies are issued on behalf of collectivities for past wrongs. He sees it as 'a form of moral exhibitionism', in which 'express[ing] correct sentiment' matters more than do issues of personal responsibility. Granted that where there is no strong institutional, national or other continuity between the group on whose behalf the apology is made and the perpetrators of the wrong for which it is an apology, the motives for making the apology can be put in doubt. In addition, where a very long time has elapsed since the wrong was done, those proffering an apology need to register clearly that responsibility and blame are not attributable to the living and that the apology represents a collective entity, institutional, national or whatever.
Beyond this, however, Dalrymple's stance amounts to denying that social collectivities are real. But they are, even though they can't exist without individual people. And it amounts to denying that such collectivities can have moral or legal responsibilities. But they can. Consequently, the claim that apologies can't, or shouldn't ever, be made on behalf of a collectivity has nothing going for it. If the Turkish government were one day to apologize on behalf of Turkey for the Armenian genocide, this would be, or at least could be, a proper national acknowledgement of a terrible crime rather than a form of moral exhibitionism.