George asks whether it is useful to have the category of crime adjoined to that of war, as in the concept of a war crime. In doing so he alludes to ways in which the international legal system differs from domestic legal systems (a point that was argued by Tom Freeman in the post I linked to here), and says that by the same principles that make the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki war crimes, so was the bombing of Dresden and the bombing of London.
I agree with George about these latter cases. The intentional targeting of civilians is a war crime, and not just the use of nuclear weapons against them. That is why terrorism is a criminal act. So is the carpet-bombing of population centres. I also agree that one shouldn't treat international law as if it were a system without blemishes, imperfections, problems - to be remedied and improved upon - and I have argued this at length.
On the other hand, to dismiss the concept of crime from the conduct of war would amount, in effect, to allowing that war may be lawless - fought without moral restraints of any kind, only strategic ones. I cannot think this is something George would really want to countenance. Laws have their effect not only through active enforcement and the application of legal penalties when they are broken, as important as these things are. They also operate by influencing the conduct of the participants in war, and (sometimes) restraining it. Whatever the deficits of international law may be at present, the world would be a different, and a worse, place if there were no laws of war and no concept of war crimes.
