Shuggy wants to persuade us that 'it's a mistake to believe that rights can form the basis of all morality'. He's right, but I think there are more straightforward examples than the ones he chooses (concerning bestiality and jealousy). Thus if J is feeling low one day, she may have no right against K as to whether he devotes any of his time to trying to cheer her up, but it wouldn't be at all strange if he thought that that was a good thing for him to do, because of how it might help J. Again, I may be contractually bound to you in such a way that I'm obliged to show up for work on Monday morning, and you have the right that I should show up; but it would be morally wrong for me to do so if I could save someone from a dire emergency by not going to work, and only by not going to work, and no one else could save them. We cannot get by without the concept of rights in our moral reasoning, but they don't exhaust the field.