In this article Samuel Brittan urges us to pay attention to the first part of Winston Churchill's well-known judgement about democracy - namely, 'that [it] is a very bad system, but all the others are worse'. This being his purpose, he ought not to overstate the problems with democracy, such as they are. But he does.
For example, he starts by pointing out that democratic decision procedures can produce paradoxical results. Yes, they can. In an electorate consisting of you, me and Grace Poole, if I prefer cricket to football and football to golf, you prefer football to golf and golf to cricket, and Grace Poole prefers golf to cricket and cricket to football, then if we vote between football and golf, so as to eliminate one, golf will lose; and if we then vote between cricket and football, football will lose - so leaving cricket the winner. But if we had voted first between cricket and golf, cricket would have been eliminated in the first round.
Brittan says, misleadingly, that there's no way round the paradox, citing the authority of Kenneth Arrow. But what Arrow showed - all he showed - is that, on reasonable assumptions about the characteristics that you want a democratic decision procedure to have, there is no decision procedure which won't sometimes produce paradoxical results - given some particular distribution of preferences across an electorate. In the matter of cricket, football and golf, there are many preference rankings you, me and Grace Poole could have that would produce quite logical and uncomplicated results.
It doesn't help if you exaggerate the problem.
Later in the same piece, Brittan says 'democracy is not itself a sufficient protection for human freedom'. Indeed not. But this is only news to someone who starts by thinking that democracy is the sole political value.