Americans, Sunni and Shia (updated)

Stratfor's latest sample analysis:

Al-Sistani did not want the June 30 transition to go forward on U.S. terms. The Iranians did not want the United States to think it had Iran on the defensive. A confrontation with the United States under these circumstances was precisely what was in both al-Sistani and Iran's interests. Both wanted to drive home to the Americans that they held power in Iraq and that the United States was there at the sufferance of the Shia. The United States had forgotten its sense of desperation during the Sunni Ramadan offensive, and the Shia needed to remind them - but they needed to do so without a rupture with Washington, which was, after all, instrumental to their long-term plans.

Al-Sadr was the perfect instrument. He was dangerous, deniable and manageable. U.S. officials have expressed surprise that al-Sadr - who they did not regard highly - was able to create such havoc. Obviously, al-Sistani could have dealt with al-Sadr if and when he wished. But for the moment, al-Sistani didn't wish. He wanted to show the Americans the abyss they faced if they continued on the path to June 30 without modifying the plan.

The Americans have said al-Sistani has not been helpful in this crisis. He is not ready to be helpful and won't be until a more suitable understanding is reached with the United States. He will act in due course because it is not in al-Sistani's interests to allow al-Sadr to become too strong. Quite the contrary: Al-Sistani runs the risk that the situation will get so far out of hand that he will not be able to control it either. But al-Sistani is too strong for al-Sadr to undermine, and al-Sadr is, in fact, al-Sistani's pawn. Perhaps more precisely, al-Sadr is al-Sistani's ace in the hole. Having played him, al-Sistani will be as interested in liquidating al-Sadr's movement as the United States is - once Washington has modified its plans for a postwar Iraq.

The worst-case scenario is not likely to happen. The Sunni guerrillas are not a long-term threat. The Shia are a long-term threat, but their interests are not in war with the United States, but in achieving a Shiite-dominated Iraqi state as quickly as possible - without giving the United States an opportunity to double-cross them. Al-Sistani demanded elections and didn't get them. What he really wants is a different transition process that gives the Shia more power. After the past week, he is likely to get it. And Washington will not soon forget who controls Iraq.

This will pass. But the strategic reality of the U.S. forces in Iraq is permanent. Those forces are there because of the sufferance of the Iraqi Shia. The Shia know it, and they want the Americans to know it. With Washington planning an offensive in Pakistan, the last thing it needs is to pump more forces into Iraq. In due course, al-Sistani will become helpful, but the price will be even higher than before.

(Hat tip: Alina Gildiner.) See also the post at the The Mesopotamian dated April 8 and beginning so:

What has been demonstrated now is the almost certain scenario to be expected if the U.S. decided to suddenly withdraw and leave the matter to local hands. The Country will be divided to three regions in no time. Those who will be in control in two of these regions will be precisely those against whom the Coalition is battling at the moment, the third will be under the control of the Kurds of course. Civil war between these groups will inevitably ensue very quickly. It is now clearly demonstrated that there are no viable local forces to stand against these elements. In addition, terrible pogroms and atrocities will be perpetrated against all the democratic movements and individuals and ordinary people.

However, you will be astonished that the solution is not as hard as you might imagine...

And read the rest. How sound are these understandings of the situation? I don't know. But I hope that those forces with an interest in preventing a downward spiral may still prevail. (Via Michael Totten.)

Update at 9.30 PM. See also this post at Iraq the Model. (Via Andrew Sullivan.)