Democratic self-determination and nationhood
James Grant is aiming to disengage the principle of self-determination from the idea of nationhood. The context of his argument is Scottish nationalism, to which he is opposed; but I won't be dealing with that specifically in what follows. I want to examine the general arguments he makes for thinking it might be time 'we abandoned claims to national self-determination'. I think Grant is wrong on three counts.
1. He says that there's 'no single, common will of the Scottish people, only a multitude of individual wills'. Whatever may be true about the state of Scottish opinion, it is not true that a multitude cannot have a common will. The members of a bridge club, for example, may be united in the common purpose of playing bridge on a more or less regular basis, so that it makes perfect sense to speak of them having, in this regard at least, a shared purpose or a common will. It can even make sense where a small minority of club members aren't particulary interested in playing bridge but belong to the club for social reasons: getting out of the house, spending the evening in company, etc. If the great majority of members are there primarily for the bridge, there is, meaningfully, a common will. This doesn't mean, however, that there is some metaphysical entity 'higher' than the people who make up the club - hovering somewhere above the building in which they meet. Their 'common will' is just another way of describing the fact that there is a purpose that most of them share.
2. Grant writes as if, for democratically-minded individuals, membership of humanity might suffice; for he counterposes our common humanity, our human dignity, to more particularist, national allegiances, which divide us. But this is - empirically - a false counterposition. It is false even for those of us strongly wedded to universal and humanist values. Nobody is satisfied with being part of the human race, as good as this is. It can still feel rather impersonal when the collectivity in question is numbered in the thousands of millions. So we have friends, families; looser affiliations with people of like mind in one matter or another; and ethnic or national identities. Of course, particularist memberships can take ugly, exclusivist forms, but they don't have to. A person can have friends without this implying any contempt towards those who are strangers; he or she can feel attached to the fact of being French or Norwegian without disparaging the culture or identity of Italians and Danes.
3. Finally, not only does the democratic self-determination of rationally autonomous individuals not rule out the idea of nationhood, it actually allows it - its procedures accommodate it. National divisions may well be 'accidental by-products of human history', but that doesn't mean they are of no significance to the people they affect. (It is an accident of history that you grow up speaking English or Greek or Swahili. That doesn't mean it's of no consequence to you that that is the language you know, as becomes apparent to anyone who is forbidden the use of their own language.) If rationally autonomous individuals have rights to act collectively in certain ways, as they do so long as they respect the democratic rights of everyone else, one of the things they may legitimately decide on is to associate with others in ways that mutually suit them. This doesn't require the coincidence of nations with states but it does permit that - subject to the proviso (protecting minority rights) just registered.